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ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION
Areto A. Imoukhuede
ABSTRACT
This paper suggests that although each state within the
United States currently recognizes a right to public education,
the states do not provide meaningful and consistent judicial
enforcement of the right. Recognizing a federal fundamental
right to public education would be a step towards ensuring
meaningful and consistent judicial enforcement of the right

INTRODUCTION
Public education has been recognized by each state in the
United States of America as a right.1 Yet, the U.S. has failed to
consistently protect the right to public education. Most states
have a right to public education explicitly recognized in the text
of their state constitutions while the few that do not have it in
their states constitution’s text have judicially recognized
education as an implied fundamental right or value under their
state constitution. The broad recognition of the right to public
education by the several states demonstrates that education is
fundamental to ordered liberty within the United States. In
short, although public education is not an enumerated right, it
should nonetheless be recognized as a fundamental right under
the U.S. Constitution. This symposium-inspired piece suggests
that although each state within the United States currently
recognizes a right to public education, the states do not provide
meaningful and consistent judicial enforcement of the right.
Recognizing a federal fundamental right to public education

Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law. Please email your
comments to: ai44@nova.edu.
1. Emily Parker, 50-State Review: Constitutional Obligations for Public Education,
EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Mar. 2016), https://www.ecs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligations-for-public-education-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A32K-QMMH].
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would be a step towards ensuring meaningful and consistent
judicial enforcement of the right.
Part I of the article asserts that education is a fundamental
human right. The part begins by considering the meaning of a
fundamental right before addressing both the historical and
philosophical arguments for recognizing the right to public
education. Part II introduces how the states have constitutionally
and judicially defined the right to public education. This part
concludes by considering the ongoing racial inequalities in
public education at the center of much of the failures to protect
education rights. Part III evaluates the effectiveness of state
judicial approaches in protecting the right to public education
and concludes that there is inconsistent judicial enforcement of
by the states of the right to public education. The part suggests
that consistent and meaningful judicial enforcement of the right
requires recognizing a federal fundamental right to public
education.

I. EDUCATION IS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT
Education is a fundamental human right and ought to
therefore be recognized as a fundamental right under the U.S.
Constitution. This part addresses both the historical and
philosophical arguments for recognizing the right to public
education before considering the ongoing racial inequalities in
public education at the center of much of the education rights
enforcement battles.

A. Defining Fundamental Rights
Before considering education as a fundamental right, we
begin by defining a fundamental right. “[F]undamental rights are
defined as those rights that are so rooted in the nation’s history
and traditions that the Supreme Court recognizes them as
fundamental.”2 Fundamental rights need not be explicitly stated
2. Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide
Public Education, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. P OL’Y 45, 53-54 (2011) (citing Derek Black,
Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step Toward
Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1409-10
(2006)); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-97
(1989) (noting that the purpose of the Due Process Clause was to protect the people from
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in the text of the U.S. Constitution, which is to say that
unenumerated rights have been recognized as fundamental
rights.3 For example, the Court today recognizes as fundamental
rights both the right to privacy and the right to interstate travel,
neither of which are enumerated as rights within the
Constitution. 4
Rights can be framed in the negative—as freedoms from
government action—liberties. Rights can also be framed in the
positive—as obligations for the government to act—duties.
Federally recognizing a fundamental right to public education
would arguably require the government to fulfill a duty while
protecting a fundamental liberty—the freedom from ignorance.5
The Court has a problematic “negative rights bias” which has
“stifled the development of a positive rights-based
jurisprudence.”6 This has specifically undermined the
development of a consistent and meaningful jurisprudence
regarding the fundamental right to public education.

B. Education is a Human Right
Education is a human right. The human right is widely
recognized under international treaty law. For example, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (hereinafter, “The International Covenant”) is one of
several treaties and international agreements that recognizes the
the State and not to ensure that the State protected them from each other); Jackson v. City
of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative
rather than positive liberties.”).
3. Imoukhuede, supra note 2, at 53.
4. Id. at 47; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (holding that a
regulation “touch[ing] on the fundamental right of interstate movement” must promote a
compelling state interest). For examples of unenumerated fundamental rights, see United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (right to interstate travel); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to
marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to
procreate); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right to direct a child’s upbringing);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (right to abortion included
in right to privacy); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (right to refuse medical
treatment).
5. Imoukhuede, supra note 2, at 58; see also President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special
Message to the Congress on Education: “The Fifth Freedom” (Feb. 5, 1968), in 1 PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1968-69, at
165, 171-762 (1970).
6. Imoukhuede, supra note 2, at 90.
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right to public education as a human right. The right is
recognized throughout the International Covenant, including in
Article 13, which states that:
[Parties to the] Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to education. They agree that education shall be
directed to the full development of the human personality
and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further
agree that education shall enable all persons to participate
effectively in a free society, promote understanding,
tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial,
ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the
United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 7

Thus, the International Covenant proclaims the obligation
of government that are party to the International Covenant to
guarantee broad public access to education.
Other international law that describes a human right to
public education includes Article 26 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Universal
Declaration”). Article 26 of the Universal Declaration states:
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be
free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.
Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and
professional education shall be made generally available
and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on
the basis of merit.
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of
the human personality and to the strengthening of respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all
nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of
peace.
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of
education that shall be given to their children. 8

7. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 13, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
8. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. XXVI (Dec.
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The Universal Declaration thereby declares education as a
fundamental human right that government has a duty to protect
and enforce.
Furthermore, the right to public education is rooted in
contemporary approaches to maintaining liberty and democracy.
As was discussed in Education Rights and the New Due
Process:
Education is a basic human capability that is
necessary for advancing both liberty and human dignity
under Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities
approach. The capabilities approach is particularly relevant
to the discussion of an education right because it has
become an internationally embraced modern theory of
justice that shares an American embrace of equal
opportunity . . . .
Without equal and fair access to education, liberty
becomes meaningless and democracy an empty concept
capable of immediate devolution into aristocracy or
plutocracy.9

Contemporary approaches to evaluating and maintaining
liberty and democracy identify education as essential. The lack
of equal and fair access to education undermines fundamental
aspects of democratic self-governance.

C. Public Education is a Fundamental Right in the U.S.
The right to public education is strongly rooted in the
history, traditions, and laws of the U.S. Notwithstanding the
problematic San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez holding, the right to public education is a
fundamental right in the U.S. and should be recognized as such
under the U.S. Constitution.10

10, 1948).
9. Areto Imoukhuede, Education Rights and the New Due Process, 47 IND. L. REV.
467, 481, 507 (2014); see also AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 5 (1999)
(“What people can positively achieve is influenced by economic opportunities, political
liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, and
the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives.”).
10. See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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1. History and Traditions Show Education is Fundamental
U.S. leaders have pursued free, public education since the
founding of the nation. Although they did not fully realize their
goals during their time, founders of the nation, such as Thomas
Jefferson and Samuel Knox, sponsored laws to further public
education. 11 Thomas Jefferson’s Virginia “Bill for the General
Diffusion of Knowledge” of 1779, called for public funding for
building schools and also guaranteed all free children three years
of free, public education.12 This bill is reflective of an early
belief in the duty of government to provide public education—at
least for those who were not enslaved. 13 Jefferson believed that
society had a duty to educate children who had demonstrated
superior intellectual ability at the common expense, even if they
could not afford education.14
Reverend Samuel Knox, another leader in the American
Revolutionary War, called for broader government involvement
in education than Jefferson. In his 1799 writing, An Essay on
the Best System of Liberal Education Adapted to the Genius of
the Government of the United States, he made what the earliest
call for a national system of education in America.15 Knox, a
republican and therefore a believer in local government, called
for a national system of education, describing the historic
superiority of public education over private education. 16
The initial efforts of the founding generation did not result
in a national system of public education. Later, after the Civil
War, the Reconstruction Era freedmen’s schools manifested the
social, political, and legal recognition of the centrality of
11. Imoukhuede, supra note 2, at 61-62. See generally BENJAMIN RUSH, Of the
Mode of Education Proper in a Republic, in ESSAYS, LITERARY, MORAL, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL 6 (2d ed. 1806); SAMUEL KNOX, AN ESSAY ON THE BEST SYSTEM OF
LIBERAL EDUCATION ADAPTED TO THE GENIUS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 4-7 (1799); Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for the More General Diffusion of
Knowledge (1799), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 414 (Paul L.
Ford ed. 1904).
12. A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, supra note 11, at 415, 41718; see also Imoukhuede, supra note 2, at 61-62.
13. A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, supra note 11, at 415; see
also Imoukhuede, supra note 2, at 61-62.
14. A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, supra note 11, at 415; see
also Imoukhuede, supra note 2, at 62.
15. KNOX, supra note 11, at 66-71 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 59-66.

2019

ENFORCING THE RIGHT

451

education to freedom and democratic self-governance. 17 W.E.B.
DuBois wrote in his widely lauded historical work, Black
Reconstruction, how the public schools in the southern U.S.
were founded. 18
The first great mass movement for public education at
the expense of the state, in the South, came from Negroes.
Many leaders before the [Civil War] had advocated general
education, but few had been listened to. Schools for
indigents and paupers were supported, here and there, and
more or less spasmodically. Some states had elaborate
plans, but they were not carried out. Public education for
all at public expense, was, in the South, a Negro idea. 19

This history demonstrates the developing recognition of
education’s importance and relationship with the concept of
freedom. So that as the nation’s conceptions of liberty and
democracy evolved, so too did conceptions regarding the
fundamentality of public education.

2. U.S. Treaty Obligations Create a Duty to Provide Public
Education
U.S. law obligates government to enforce the human right
to public education.20 The previously described international
laws
as
well
as
the
state
laws,
form
a
grid/network/combination/tapestry of legal obligations that
together create a duty for the government to provide public
education. 21
As to the international obligations, the U.S. is a signatory to
the International Covenant which as described earlier,
recognizes an international duty for states to provide public
education. 22 While the U.S. has not ratified the International
17. Imoukhuede, supra note 9, at 495; see also W. E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, BLACK
RECONSTRUCTION: AN ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE P ART WHICH BLACK FOLK
PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1860-1880, at 637
(1935).
18. DU BOIS, supra note 17, at 638.
19. Id. at 638.
20. See Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under
the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U.
L. REV. 550, 550-53 (1992).
21. See discussion supra Section I.B.
22. Ann I. Park, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights
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Covenant it is signatory to and has ratified several other United
Nations Conventions, including the U.N. Charter, which
proclaims the duty of states to protect “human rights and
fundamental freedoms.”23 The U.N. Charter depends upon
subsequent treaties and conventions, to define the scope of
protected human rights.24 The Universal Declaration is one of
those conventions. As was previously mentioned, Article 26 of
the Universal Declaration describes the right to public education
as a human right.25 As discussed in Freedom from Ignorance:
The International Duty to Provide Public Education:
U.S. courts ought to recognize the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as binding, both because the
Universal Declaration has been ratified by the U.S. and
because it is widely viewed to have now attained the status
of customary international law . . . .
Given that international treaties are on the same level
as federal statutes on the domestic hierarchy of laws, the
fact that the U.S. is a party to this Convention serves as
more than a normative justification for the right, but
describes its actual existence under federal law. 26

The existence of Article 26 supports a human right to
public education and the U.S. being party to the Universal
Declaration supports recognizing the human right as a
fundamental right within the U.S.
The significance of the U.S. being a signatory to these
international treaties and the ratification of such treaties makes
the right a part of federal law, which arguably creates a statutory
right to public education that supersedes state laws, pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI to the U.S. Constitution. 27
The 1900 Paquete Habana case establishes the legal precedent
for the domestic recognition of international law and ratified

Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1221 (1987).
23. Areto A. Imoukhuede, Freedom from Ignorance: The International Duty to
Provide Public Education, in PUBLIC LAW AND SOCIAL HUMAN RIGHTS 59, 63-64 (David
A. Frenkel ed. 2013); U.N. Charter art. 55.
24. U.N. Charter art. 55.
25. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 8, art. XXVI.
26. Imoukhuede, supra note 23, at 64.
27. “This Constitution . . . and all Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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treaties as binding upon U.S. courts.28 This notwithstanding, at
least one U.S. federal district court in Texas has avoided
enforcing the international right to public education, suggesting
that “the right to education, while it represents an important
international goal, has not acquired the status of customary
international law.”29 A treaty obligation need not be customary
international law to be enforceable by a member to the treaty.
Furthermore, while there is no acknowledged federal
fundamental right to public education, each state within the
United States recognizes the right to public education. The fact
that every state recognizes a right to public education would
suggest that for purposes of defining a fundamental right, today
each state within the United State has acknowledged and
deigned to protect this right to public education as a fundamental
component to ordered liberty either by way of the explicit text of
their state constitutions or by way of judicial acknowledgement
that the right is part of their state constitutions. These state
guarantees regarding the right to public education are the
subjects of our next part.

II. EACH STATE RECOGNIZES THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC
EDUCATION
While there is no federal “fundamental right” to public
education, each state recognizes the right.30 San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez held that there is no
right to public education under the U.S. Constitution. 31 The
impact of that holding was that Mexican-American school
children who were challenging a Texas statute that funded
elementary and high schools with property taxes failed because
there was no fundamental right at stake that would elevate the

28. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
29. In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 596 (S.D. Tex.
1980); Derek Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 735, 790 (2018).
30. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (stating that
there is no explicit right to education under the U.S. Constitution); But cf. Karen
Swenson, School Finance Litigation: Why Are Some State Supreme Courts Activist and
Others Restrained?, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1148, 1148 (2000) (“All fifty state constitutions
contain provisions guaranteeing a right to free public education.”).
31. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
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case to a higher level of constitutional scrutiny. The case was
evaluated under the rational basis test. Additionally, wealth was
found not to be a suspect classification, so the law was not found
to fall within a suspect classification under equal protection
scrutiny.
However, the problem with this case was avoided in Plyler
v. Doe, which came after Rodriguez. There, the Court treated
education as an important right that receives more than the
minimal level of constitutional scrutiny. 32 Plyler held that
despite not being a fundamental right, education was such an
important right that undocumented children cannot be denied it
simply because they are undocumented.33 The state was found
to be required to demonstrate an important reason for the denial
of the right—despite the fact that the Court does not deem it to
be a fundamental right.34
The relevance of these cases is unclear in the contemporary
education context where, despite the failure to formally
recognize a federal right to public education, each state
recognizes a right under its own state constitution. This fact
would suggest that for purposes of defining a fundamental right,
today each state within the United State has acknowledged and
deigned to protect this right to public education as a fundamental
component to ordered liberty.
Therefore, following the
definition of fundamental rights being those rights that are
fundamental to ordered liberty in the U.S., there exists a right to
public education that exists with the support of state
constitutions.35 However, this fragmented approach to a right is
problematic because of the lack of uniformity in both the
language and its mode for enforcement.

A. Some States Recognize a Right to a High-Quality
Education
Some state constitutions go as far as to recognize a right to
a high quality education. The states that fall under this category
include the states of Illinois, Florida, and Rhode Island.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 203, 221-23 (2005).
Id. at 230.
Id. at 223-24.
Swenson, supra note 30; Black, supra note 29. .
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1. ILLINOIS - ll. Const. Art. 10, § 1.
According to the Illinois state constitution:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the
educational development of all persons to the limits of their
capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services.
Education in public schools through the secondary level
shall be free.36

This language suggests that Illinois is committed to more
than the existence of free, public school but also to a high
quality standard for those schools.
2. FLORIDA - Fla. Const. Art. 9 § 1.
According to the Florida state constitution:
The education of children is a fundamental value of
the people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a
paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for
the education of all children residing within its borders.
Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform,
efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free
public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality
education and for the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of institutions of higher learning and other public
education programs that the needs of the people may
require.37

The language here similarly invokes a high quality
standard, like Illinois. The Florida Constitution’s Article 9
Education mandate goes further by providing detailed
requirements for fulfilling high quality standard for Florida
schools.

36. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
37. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
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B. Others Recognize a Right to an Adequate Education
Other state constitutions are more limited, recognizing a
right to an adequate education. The states that fall under this
category include the states of Arkansas and New York.
1. ARKANSAS - Ark. Const. Art. 14, § 1
According to the Arkansas state constitution:
Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty
and the bulwark of a free and good government, the State
shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system
of free public schools and shall adopt all suitable means to
secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of
education. 38
The guarantee of “suitable” public education has been
interpreted as invoking right to an adequate education.
2. NEW YORK - McKinney’s Const. Art. 11, § 1
According to the New York state constitution:
The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all
the children of this state may be educated. 39

Thus, despite Rodriguez and in accord with Brown v. Board
of Education and Plyler v. Doe, we have by way of the states, a
right to public education that exists with the support of state
constitutions. As noted above, this fragmented approach to a
right, is problematic in the lack of consistency and meaningful
enforcement, which we will discuss next.

III. INSUFFICIENT STATE JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE
STATE RIGHT
This part suggests that recognizing an equal right to a
public education is essential to establishing a meaningful right to
38. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
39. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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public education. The section argues that to protect an equal
right to public education, the most stringent standard for
constitutional scrutiny—strict scrutiny—must be updated to
more fully protect positive rights. In advancing this argument, it
first suggests that a uniform national standard is necessary for
evaluating fulfillment of the obligation to provide a high quality,
public education. Next, this part critiques current state standards
for review and the extent to which they succeed and fall short of
meaningfully guaranteeing racial equality with regard to the
right to public education for non-white children. This part
concludes by suggesting that in the context of positive rights, the
intent requirement for demonstrating discrimination is
particularly burdensome and must be circumvented in order to
fully guarantee an equal right to public education.

A. States have not Enforced Racial Equality in
Public Education
This would be an ideal space for application of
Congressional powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth
amendment to at least prevent discrimination in the application
of this state created right, irrespective of the Congress’ desire to
create full-blown administration that protects and enforces a
federal right to public education.40 Equal Protection could also
stand in to protect the right to public education on an
individualized basis through lawsuits or even class actions.
The current problem is that the U.S. Supreme Court has
limited the scope of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
powers in two especially problematic ways. First, the Court has
held that notwithstanding the expansive rights protection goals
of the Fourteenth Amendment as articulated by its framers,
Congress may not use its powers under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to expand the scope of rights. 41
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
41. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (“By including [Section 5] the
draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
classic formulation of the reach of those powers was established by Chief Justice Marshall
in McCulloch v. Maryland: ‘Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
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In City of Boerne v. Flores, local zoning authorities denied
a Catholic Archbishop building permit to enlarge the church
under a historic preservation ordinance. 42 The Archbishop
brought suit challenging the ordinance under Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).43 The United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas entered judgment for the
city, determining that Congress had exceeded the scope of its
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in enacting RFRA. 44
A second problematic limitation on the Fourteenth
Amendment powers of Congress is the rule from Washington v.
Davis, which limits heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only to those
instances where intent to discriminate against a suspect
classification can be shown. 45 This rule makes it all but
impossible to obtain meaningful review of government actions
that undermine equal access to public education, such as those
taken in Rodriguez.46 Constitutionalizing the right would
mandate uniformity in the level of scrutiny and analysis.
The proposed solution of constitutionalizing a right to
public education on a federal level would mandate an explicit
acknowledgment of education as a positive obligation of
government. All too often, the Court demonstrates a libertarian
bias that treats rights as only including liberties or freedoms
from government action, as though government’s only
obligation is to not act under certain enumerated circumstances.
It is clear throughout the U.S. Constitution that government,
both federal and state, have an obligation to act. Government
exists to further some purposes.47 Those purposes include, as the
Preamble states, “secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity . . .” in the broad sense.48 However,
constitutional.’”) (citations omitted); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 545 (1997)
(“Congress lacks the ability independently to define or expand the scope of constitutional
rights by statute.”).
42. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 545.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1976).
46. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 1 (1973).
47. Areto A. Imoukhuede, Gun Rights and the New Lochnerism, 47 SETON HALL L.
REV. 329, 390 (2017).
48. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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in the specific sense, to provide for “a Republican Form of
Government” as well as to “regulate Commerce,” and “to coin
Money, [and] regulate the value thereof . . . .”49 As I have
previously described, education is a tool that allows for people
to develop the tools necessary to meaningfully participate in
representative democracy.
The nation’s education systems have failed to consistently
guarantee a high quality or even an adequate, basic education.
These failures disproportionately undermine access for nonwhite children. 50 Despite the rhetoric of American Equality, the
school experiences of African-American and other “minority”
students in the United States continue to be substantially
separate and unequal. Nonwhite children continue to receive
fewer resources in their schools and a lower quality of public
education. These disparities continue to exist notwithstanding
the heightened scrutiny standard that ostensibly exists for
discrimination based on race and national origin, non-white
children continue to receive fewer resources in their schools and
a lower quality of public education.51 Racial inequality in
education must be corrected by way of enforcing the already
recognized right to public education that is guaranteed under
each state’s laws. This inequality is at the heart of the states’
failed enforcement of the right to public education.
Focusing on racial disparities, renowned education scholar,
Linda Darling-Hammond, has demonstrated that in the state of
California, a state where the minimal adequacy is the governing
standard the state’s non-white students have far worse
educational outcomes compared to white students. 52 “In 1990
for example, the Los Angeles City School District was sued by
students in predominately minority schools because their
schools were not only overcrowded and less well funded than
other schools, they were also disproportionately staffed by
inexperienced and unprepared teachers hired on emergency
credentials.”53 Often, the educational outcomes for non-white
49. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 4.; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
50. Linda Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and Education,
BROOKINGS INST. (March 1, 1998), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unequalopportunity-race-and-education/ [https://perma.cc/4XWU-YP63].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Linda Darling-Hammond, Inequality in Teaching and Schooling: How
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students fall below established metrics for evaluating the receipt
of a minimally adequate education. This is, in fact, the
consistent result of Darling-Hammond’s studies throughout the
“U.S. educational system, which is one of the most unequal in
the industrialized world, and that students routinely receive
dramatically different learning opportunities based on their
social status.”54
To be clear, the education problem is one of race.
According to the studies, Black students and most other nonwhite students, receive a quality of education that is far less than
that of their white peers. This, surprisingly, is true even when
Black students attend the same schools. The problem becomes
exacerbated when they attend increasingly segregated schools. 55
After years of efforts to desegregate, many, including the
Supreme Court, seem to have given up on integration as a
solution to the educational inequality problem.

B. High-Quality Public Education Standards Not
Enforced
Every state recognizes a right to public education in some
form. 56 Illinois, Florida, and Rhode Island are among those that
go further than simply announcing an education right, but
Opportunity Is Rationed to Students of Color in America, in THE RIGHT THING TO DO, THE
SMART THING TO DO: ENHANCING DIVERSITY IN THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS: SUMMARY
OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON DIVERSITY IN HEALTH PROFESSIONS IN HONOR OF HERBERT W.
NICKENS, M.D. (Smedley, B.D., Stith, A.Y., Colburn, L. et al., eds. 2001).
54. Darling-Hammond, supra note 50.
55. Id.
56. Karen Swenson, School Finance Litigation: Why Are Some State Supreme
Courts Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1147-49 (2000) (“All fifty state
constitutions contain provisions guaranteeing a right to free public education.”).
Although every state constitution, except that of Mississippi, has a provision
which, at a minimum, mandates that some sort of system of free public
education be maintained, the duty imposed by the constitutional text varies a
great deal. At one end of the spectrum are the seventeen “establishment
provisions” which simply mandate that a free public school system be
established and nothing more. In the middle are eighteen “quality
provisions,” which mandate that an educational system of a specific quality
be provided. Finally, at the other end of the spectrum are fourteen “high duty
provisions” which seem to place education above other governmental
functions such as highways or welfare.
William E. Throd, A New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance
Litigation, 14 J. L. & P OL. 525, 538-40 (1998).
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include within its state constitution a quality component. 57 For
example, Illinois guarantees a right to “high quality” educational
services. 58 According to the Illinois Constitution:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the
educational development of all persons to the limits of their
capacities. The State shall provide for an efficient system of
high quality public educational institutions and services.
Education in public schools through the secondary level
shall be free. There may be such other free education as the
General Assembly provides by law. The State has the
primary responsibility for financing the system of public
education. 59

Unfortunately, the high-quality component to the right has
been read to be of little effect by the Illinois court as illustrated
in Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar.60
In Edgar, the court held that although a court would
consider a constitutional challenge under the education clause of
the state constitution based on a theory that poor school districts
provided inadequate education, disparities in educational
funding between school districts based on relative property
wealth did not offend the “efficiency” provision of the Illinois
State Constitution.61 Regarding the question of whether state
educational institutions and services were of “high quality,” the
court ruled that such a decision was outside sphere of judicial
function because the state constitutional right to public
education was not a fundamental right for purposes of equal
57. Throd, supra note 52, at 539 n.40.
58. See ILL. CONST. art. 10, § 1 (West, Westlaw through April 1, 2019).
59. Id.
60.
[The court] conclude[d] that the question of whether the educational
institutions and services in Illinois are “high quality” is outside the sphere of
the judicial function. To the extent plaintiffs’ claim that the system for
financing public schools is unconstitutional rests on perceived deficiencies in
the quality of education in public schools, the claim was properly dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under
the education article of our state constitution.
Committee for Ed. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1193 (Ill. 1996).
61. “[W]e agree with the courts below that disparities in educational funding
resulting from differences in local property wealth do not offend section 1’s efficiency
requirement.” Id. at 1189. “[W]e conclude that questions relating to the quality of
education are solely for the legislative branch to answer.” Id.
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protection analysis. 62 Applying reasoning hauntingly similar to
that used in Rodriguez the court ruled the funding system that
had created disparities between school districts, based on local
wealth was rationally related to a legitimate state goal of
promoting local control of education. 63
Other state courts have also chosen to read-out of their
constitutions’ quality components.64 The Florida court in
Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles,
expressed concerns about usurping the legislature’s
responsibility for education and the lack of manageable
standards in evaluating education. 65 Similarly, in City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, a Rhode Island court went as far as to
direct the plaintiffs in that education case to instead seek relief
from the legislature because the legislature had “virtually

62. Id. at 1195 (“While education is certainly a vitally important governmental
function, it is not a fundamental individual right for equal protection purposes, and thus the
appropriate standard of review is the rational basis test. Under the rational basis test,
judicial review of a legislative classification is limited and generally deferential.”) (internal
citations omitted).
63. Id. at 1196 (“In accordance with Rodriguez and the majority of state court
decisions, and for all the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the State’s system of
funding public education is rationally related to the legitimate State goal of promoting local
control.”).
64. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1196 (“While some decisions in other jurisdictions have
concluded that there is no rational basis for funding disparities based on local wealth,
financing schemes similar to ours have been upheld by a majority of those courts that have
applied the rational basis standard.”) (internal citations omitted).
65.
While the courts are competent to decide whether or not the Legislature’s
distribution of state funds to complement local education expenditures results
in the required “uniform system,” the courts cannot decide whether the
Legislature’s appropriation of funds is adequate in the abstract, divorced
from the required uniformity. To decide such an abstract question of
“adequate” funding, the courts would necessarily be required to subjectively
evaluate the Legislature’s value judgments as to the spending priorities to be
assigned to the state’s many needs, education being one among them. In
short, the Court would have to usurp and oversee the appropriations power,
either directly or indirectly, in order to grant the relief sought by Plaintiffs.
While Plaintiffs assert that they do not ask the Court to compel the
Legislature to appropriate any specific sum, but merely to declare that the
present funding level is constitutionally inadequate, what they seek would
nevertheless require the Court to pass upon those legislative value judgments
which translate into appropriations decisions.
Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 406-407
(Fla. 1996).
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unreviewable discretion” over the public schools.66 Together,
these holdings amount to a withdrawal of judicial review over
the implementation of constitutional mandates for high, quality
education. Absent judicial review, these state constitutional
rights to education lose their mandatory character and become
merely aspirational, devoid of any real, legal significance.
Leaving the mandate limited only to what Glensy’s describes as
the hortatory approach to human dignity—expressive of an
ideal, but without a clear mandate for enforcement.67

C. Minimal Adequacy Standards Sometimes Enforced
Aside from Illinois, Florida, and Rhode Island, there are
other states where the courts have read into their constitutions or
otherwise actively enforced at least an adequacy requirement
and thus demonstrate the potential meaningful enforcement of a
66.
We concur with plaintiffs that the right to an education is a constitutional
right in this state, but we stress that article 12 assigns to the General
Assembly the responsibility for that right. The plaintiffs have not persuaded
us that this right was not capable of enforcement through the General
Assembly’s plenary powers in educational matters. Because the Legislature
is endowed with virtually unreviewable discretion in this area, plaintiffs
should seek their remedy in that forum rather than in the courts.
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57 (R.I. 1995) (emphasis added).
67.
The expressive approach, in many ways, is subsumed within each of the
other three approaches, because one cannot detach the hortatory value from
the use of the term without actually using the term, so it will always play a
role regardless of which approach is chosen. Nevertheless, the weakness with
having an approach that is solely expressive is just that—in a strictly legal
sense it has little impact, and in the non-legal sense it would be difficult to
predict what its influence eventually would be.
Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L REV. 65, 141 (2011). The
modern concept of dignity and its relation to autonomy, rationality, liberty and morality
was first enunciated by a member of the intelligentsia in the works of Immanuel Kant. See
generally, IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 42-43
(Mary Gregor ed. and trans.) (Cambridge University Press, 1997). In that work, Kant
argued that dignity is an end in itself. It does not have an instrumental value, which has
relative price or worth but rather dignity is an inner worth—something that is intrinsically
endowed on any rational and autonomous individual. Id.; see also, Ronald Dworkin, Three
Questions for America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 2006, at 24, 26; RONALD DWORKIN,
JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 191-218, 255-75 (2011). This explores the meaning of dignity
that the principles of human dignity . . .are embodied in the embodied in the Constitution
and are now common ground in America.
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right to public education. 68
Limited resources and deference to lawmakers makes
“minimal adequacy” standard attractive. The challenge is
identifying failures to provide public education that undermine
the right in the context of budget shortfalls and other pressures
on government. Given the economic realities of many states,
courts have frequently applied a minimal adequacy standard, lest
they co-opt the primary lawmaking and enforcement functions
of the legislature and executive branch of a state.69
The relative ease of finding a consensus is another appeal
of minimal adequacy. As a matter of constitutional law,
minimal adequacy’s appeal rises in this context insofar as a
minimum standard may be more readily agreed upon by experts,
whereas a high-quality standard may not be the subject of broad
agreement. Notwithstanding this, some states actually have a
high-quality standard or “quality” standard that has been
interpreted to mean high quality, in their state constitution’s text
or as central to the interpretation of that text.
One example of a state court attempting to breathe life into
a state’s constitution’s quality requirement is Rose v. Council for
Better Educ.70 Here the court held that every Kentucky child
must be provided with equal opportunity and access to an
“adequate education.”71 Another such example is Claremont II,
where the court held that the New Hampshire public schools
have a duty to provide a “constitutionally adequate education” to
every educable child. 72 In both these cases the court acted in a
manner quite contrary to that of Illinois and others, accepting
their state constitutions as actually imposing some duties on the
68. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211-12 (Ky. 1989);
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1375-76 (N.H. 1993). See also Edgar,
672 N.E.2d at 1196 (“In accordance with Rodriguez and the majority of state court
decisions, and for all the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the State’s system of
funding public education is rationally related to the legitimate State goal of promoting local
control.”).
69. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18, 58-59
(1973).
70. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 186; see also Kelly Thompson Cochran, Beyond School
Financing: Defining the Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV.
399, 401 n.12 (2000).
71. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211; see also Thompson Cochran, supra note 66, at 411.
72. Claremont Sch. Dist., 635 A.2d at 1376; see also Thompson Cochran, supra note
66, at 401 n.12.
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legislature that are not left for the legislature alone to interpret
completely independent of judicial review. 73
Still other states have actively enforced a holding that
education is a fundamental right under their constitutions. 74 For
example, in Leandro v. State the court enforced the right under
the North Carolina Constitution guaranteeing every child the
opportunity to receive a “sound basic education.” 75 Similarly, in
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State the court held that the
Washington legislature must provide funding to ensure a “basic
education” to students.76 The New York courts have also
strongly enforced the right to public education. In Board of
Educ. v. Nyquist the New York court held that New York
schools must provide a “sound basic education.” 77 A New York
court recently affirmed Nyquist, in Campaign for Fiscal Equity
v. State where New York’s funding mechanisms were found to
have an adverse and disparate impact on the city’s minority
public school students.78 Though the court recognized that the
legislature should be afforded the first opportunity to reform
public school financing, the state had failed to assure that New
York City’s public schools receive adequate funding to afford
students the “sound basic education” guaranteed by the
Education article of the New York State Constitution.79
We may now consider these examples of states where the
right to public education is vigorously enforced by the judiciary
and contrast them with those previously described states where
the right to public education is minimally enforced.80 If we add
into the comparison the formerly described states where the state

73. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 208-09; Claremont Sch. Dist., 635 A.2d at 1377-78.
74. See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254-55 (N.C. 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 90-92 (Wash. 1978); see also Thompson Cochran,
supra note 66, at 401 n.13.
75. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255.
76. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King Cty., 585 P.2d at 76-77.
77. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 359.
78. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 541-42 (2001).
79. See id.
80. Compare Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439
N.E.2d 359, 366-69 (N.Y. 1982); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254-55 (N.C. 1997);
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 90-92 (Wash. 1978) with
Committee for Ed. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189-93 (Ill. 1996); Coal. for
Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 404-408 (Fla. 1996);
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57 (R.I. 1995).
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constitutional adequacy and quality requirements are essentially
dead-letters, for example Illinois, and the landscape of interstate
divergence in the recognition and enforcement of the right to
public education becomes quite apparent.81
Given what
Lundberg describes as the nearly unanimous recognition of the
importance of the right to public education across the states;
such divergent enforcement undermines the significance of this
national priority. 82 In other situations where local enforcement
of national priorities fails to achieve equivalent standards of
application, it is deemed necessary for federal recognition and
enforcement of the fundamental right.83 This should also be so
for public education.

D. Defining Equality In Terms Of Funding Is
Insufficient Because This Approach Would Continue
To Disadvantage Non-white Children
This leads to a concern about the use of funding as the basis
for evaluating equality. The Nyquist case was a fiscal equity law
suit that framed enforcement of the right around equal funding. 84
However, quality of funding alone does not necessarily
guarantee equal results. The concern raised by James Ryan that
poor and non-white students need more resources not equal
resources in order to achieve equal results with their white
counterparts. The reasons for that have been framed around
81. Compare Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366-69; Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 254-55; Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty., 585 P.2d at 90-92 with Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1178; Chiles,
680 So. 2d at 400; Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 40.
82. See Paula J. Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis,
67 ALB. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (2000).
83. Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide
Public Education, 22 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. P OL’Y 45, 50 (2011) (“Education problems in
poor, urban, and predominantly minority communities are the result of numerous factors,
including an antiquated curriculum, inexperienced and underpaid teachers, and higher
student-to-teacher ratios when compared to wealthier, predominantly white suburban
districts. Factors in addition to school financing exacerbate the education problem.
Students in poor, urban districts tend to have greater educational needs than students in the
suburbs because of background factors such as poverty, poorly educated parents,
malnutrition, high crime rates and limited English proficiency, to name a few. It follows
that merely equalizing funding to districts will not alleviate the pervasive problems of
unequal education. What is needed is full protection of the right to equal access to a high
quality public education.”).
84. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 359.
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resource deprivation in homes and in communities, but even
those explanations fail to fully capture the scope of the concern.
Equal funding within a structure that has institutionalized racial
discrimination and that is therefore built around a hierarchy
where non-whites are at the bottom of that hierarchy, will by
definition be expected to yield results that validate that structure.

CONCLUSION
Despite the failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize
education as a U.S. constitutional right, each state has
recognized it as a fundamental right under their state
constitutions.
This means that notwithstanding the U.S.
Supreme Court’s holding, education is a right within each of the
U.S. Therefore, the U.S. ought to protect the right to public
education by recognizing a federal fundamental right to public
education. This would be a step towards ensuring meaningful
and consistent judicial enforcement of the right.

